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Executive Summary
Twenty-two miffion families currently receive a total of $34 billion in
benefits from the earned income tax credit (EITC). In fact, the EITC is
the largest cash-transfer program for lower-income families at the fed-
eral level. An unusual feature of the credit is its explicit goal to use the
tax system to encourage and support those who choose to work. A
large body of work has evaluated the labor supply effects of the EITC
and has generated several important findings regarding the behavioral
response to taxes. Perhaps the main lesson learned from the evidence is
the confirmation that real responses to taxes are important; labor sup-
ply does respond to the EITC. The second major lesson is related to
the nature of the labor supply response. A consistent finding is that
labor supply responses are concentrated along the extensive (entry)
margin, rather than the intensive (hours worked) margin. This distinc-
tion has important implications for the design of tax-transfer programs
and for the welfare evaluation of tax reforms.
1.Introduction and Overview
The past two decades in the United States have witnessed an increas-
ing reliance on the tax system as a means of providing cash assistance
to lower-income families with children. A series of tax acts starting
with the 1986 Tax Reform Act have increased assistance to the working
poor through expansions of the earned income tax credit (EITC), mak-
ing it the largest federal cash-transfer program for lower-income fami-
lies with children. Over 20 million families are projected to have
benefited from the tax credit in 2003, at a total cost to the federal74 Eissa and Hoynes
government of more than$34billion.' These transfers have been espe-
cially successful at reducing poverty in the United States. In fact, cen-
sus data suggest that the federal credit now lifts morechildren out of
poverty than any other government program. "Some4.9million peo-
ple, including2.7million children, were removed from poverty in
2002as a result of the federal EITC" (Liobrera and Zahradnik2004).
These estimates are consistent with the fact that the1993credit expan-
sion was designed such that a full-time worker earning the minimum
wage would not live in poverty.
This shift in the structure of public assistance is the outcome of a
long-standing criticism that traditional welfare programs generate ad-
verse incentives for work and family. Advocates of the earned income
tax credit have argued that the credit helps "promote both the values
of family and work." Indeed, economic theory suggests that the EITC
should be especially successful at promoting entry into the labor force
among eligible, single taxpayers.
The recent expansions have offered researchers an excellent opportu-
nity to evaluate the impacts of the EITC on behavior. Hotz and Scholz's
(2003)review of the literature on the EITC shows that researchers have
taken full advantage of this opportunity, examining outcomes such
as work behavior, marriage, fertility, consumptionexpenditures, and
overall family well-being. Here, we concentrate on the impacts of the
EITC on labor supply and in particular on the lessons learned about
the labor supply responses to tax-transfer programs. We argue that the
evaluation of the EITC has been especially useful for understanding
the size and the composition of labor supply responses to tax incen-
tives and has informed the literature on the welfare evaluation of tax
reforms as well as the optimal design of tax-transfer schemes.
In this review, we first provide a brief history of the EITC, along
with a description of the current policies and recent tax expansions. In
Section3,we provide a descriptive analysis of the EITC population.
In particular, we use IRS data to examine the characteristics of EITC
recipients, including number of children, filing status, and income. In
Section4,we use economic theory to discuss the expected impact of
the EITC on labor supply. In short, among eligible unmarried women
with children, the EITC is expected to increase employment but reduce
hours of work for those already in the labor market. To target benefits
to lower-income families, however, the EITC is based on family
income, leading to a very different set of incentives for married tax-
payers. Among secondary earners in married couples, the EITC isBehavioral Responses to Taxes 75
expected to reduce labor force participation and hours worked for
those already in the labor force.
Section 5 summarizes what is known about the impacts of the EITC
on labor supply. The nature of the expected labor supply effects of the
EITC leads us to structure our summary in the followingmanner. First,
we examine the impacts on single and married taxpayers separately,
focusing exclusively on women.2 Second, we examine separately the
two different margins of labor supply responsesthe extensive (em-
ployment) and intensive (hours worked by working individuals)mar-
gins. The overwhelming finding of the empirical literature is that EITC
has been especially successful at encouraging the employment of single
parents, especially mothers. There is little evidence, however, that the
EITC has reduced the hours worked by those already in the labor
force. The empirical literature on married women is somewhat smaller
but again consistent in its findings. The studies show that the EITC
leads to modest reductions in the employment and hours worked of
married women.
In Section 6, we discuss the possible explanations for the empirical
finding that the EITC affects the extensive but not the intensive margin.
We also discuss the general equilibrium implications of the EITCin
particular whether the EITC affects gross wages. Finally,we discuss
the implications of this work for the optimal design of the EITC. Recent
work has emphasized the role of the extensive margin in the design of
the tax-transfer schemes (Saez 2002) and the welfare evaluation oftax
reform (Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner 2004). We first review this work
and then discuss whether there are potential efficiency gains associated
with modifying the EITC. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2.Operation and Brief History of the EITC
The Earned Income Tax Credit began in 1975 as a modestprogram
aimed at offsetting the Social Security payroll tax for low-income fam-
ilies with children. It was the outcome of a vigorous policy debatesur-
rounding the efficacy of a negative income tax (NIT)as a means of
reducing poverty. The concern was that the MTwhich guaranteesa
minimum standard of living to everyonewould discourage labor
market activity as it is gradually phased out. Ultimately the EITCwas
born out of a desire to reward work.
The EITC is refundable, so that a taxpayer withno federal tax liabil-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.78 Eissa and Hoynes
the full amount of the credit. Taxpayers may also receive the credit
throughout the year with their paychecks; but in 2000, less than 5 per-
cent of EITC recipients availed themselves of this early payment option
(Friedman 2000). A taxpayer's eligibility for the earned income tax
credit depends on the taxpayer's earned income (or in some cases,
adjusted gross income) and the number of qualifying children who
meet certain age, relationship, and residency tests. First, the taxpayer
must have positive earned income, defined as wage and salary income,
business sell-employment income, and farm sell-employment income.
Also, the taxpayer must have adjusted gross income and earned in-
come below a specified amount (in 2004, the maximumallowable in-
come for a taxpayer with two or more children was $34,458).Second, a
taxpayer must have a qualifying child, who must be under age 19 (or
age 24 if a full-time student) or permanently disabled andresiding
with the taxpayer for more than half the year.3 Until 1991, the rides
for EITC eligibility were more complicated and depended on the tax-
payer's filing status.4
The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on
the taxpayer's earned income; adjusted gross income; and, since 1991,
the number of EITC-eligible children in the household. There are three
regions in the credit schedule. The initial phase-in region transfers an
amount equal to the subsidy rate times their earnings. In tax year 2004,
the subsidy rate of the EITC was 34 percent for taxpayers with one
child and 40 percent for taxpayers with two or more children. hi the
flat region, the family receives the maximum credit ($2,604 and $4,300,
respectively), while in the phase-out region, the credit is phased out at
the phase-out rate (16 and 21 percent).
Table 3.1 summarizes the parameters of the EITC over the history of
the program. The program grew slowly from its introduction in 1975
until 1986, and in fact shrank in real terms due to inflation. The 1987
expansion of the EITC, passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), increased the generosity of the credit for the lowest-income
workers and extended its benefits beyond the poorest (see Eissa and
Liebman 1996). By 1988, taxpayers with incomes between $11,000
and $18,576 became eligible for the credit and faced its phase-out mar-
ginal tax rate for the first time. The 1987 EITC expansion interacted
with other tax changes implemented after TRA86including greater
personal exemption and standard deductionto help eliminate taxes
on poor families. The largest single expansion overthis period was
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Figure 3.1
Earned Income Tax Credit, 1984-2003 (Current year dollars). (a) Schedule for Family
with One Child. (b) Schedule for Family with Two or More Children.
Notes: Authors' tabulations using tax parameters in table 3.1.
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Year
Figure 3.2
Real Spending on the E1TC (Billions of 2003 Dollars).
Source: U.S. House of Representatives (2004), Table 13-14.
1993 expansion of the EITC, phased in between 1994 and 1996, led to
an increase in the subsidy rate, from 19.5 percent to 40 percent(18.5
to 34 percent), and an increase in the maximum credit, from $1,511 to
$3,556 ($1,434 to $2,152), for taxpayers with two or more children (tax-
payers with one child). This expansion was substantially larger for
those with two or more children. The phase-out rate was also raised,
from 14 percent to 21 percent (13 to 16 percent), for taxpayers with
two or more children (taxpayers with one child). Overall, the range of
the phase-out was expanded dramatically so that, by 1996, a filing unit
with two children would still be eligible with income levels of almost
$30,000. Figure 3.1 illustrates the nominal value of the credit from 1984
to 2003 and highlights the dramatic expansion of the credit over time,
as well as its effects on the families of different sizes.
These expansions have led to a dramatic and recent increase in
the total cost of the EITC. Figure 3.2 shows the total cost (in real 2003
dollars) of the EITC from 1974-2003. The figure clearly shows the ris-
ing expenditures associated with the 1986, 1990, and 1993 tax acts. Be-
tween 1990 and 1996, the program more than doubled in real terms.
The popularity and perceived success of the EITC can also be seen in
the increasing number of states that offer state credits. As of 2004, a
total of eighteen states have introduced state EITCs that supplementBehavioral Responses to Taxes 81
Table 3.2
State Earned Income Tax Credits, 2004
State (year started) Percentage of Federal Credit (2004)
Refundable credits
Colorado (1999) 10% (suspended until 2006)
District of Columbia (2000) 25%
Illinois (2000) 5%




Minnesota (1991) Varies with earnings; averages 33%
New Jersey (2000) 20% (for families with earnings below $20,000)
New York (1994) 30%
Oklahoma (2002) 5%
Vermont (1988) 32%





Rhode Islandc (1975) 25%
Virginia (2004) 20% (effective 2006)
Source: Liobrera and Zahradnjk (2004) and www.stateElTC.info (State EITC OnlineInfo
Center).
a Maryland also offersa non-refundable EITC set at 50% of the credit. Taxpayers may
claim either the refundable credit or the non-refundable credit, butnot both.
bMaines non-refundable EITCwas reduced from 5% to 4.92% effective in tax years 2003,
2004, and 2005. The credit will return to 5% in 2006.
CRhode Island made a very small portion of its EITC refundable effective beginningin tax
year 2003.
the federal credit.6 Almost all states structure their creditsas a share of
the federal credit, varying between 5 percent (Illinois)to more than 40
percent (Mirmesota and Wisconsin), and almost all make the creditre-
fundable like the federal credit. Table 3.2 presents the characteristicsof
state EITCs along with the date of their introduction. It is notable that
several states either introduced or expanded credits since theeconomic
downturn starting in 2000, including Virginia, Indiana, Iffinois,and
Kansas. This continuing growth of state EITCs has been attributedto a
recognition among state policymakers that "state E1TC'scan help
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Figure 3.3
EITC Benefit for Selected Hourly Wage Levels, by AnnualHours Worked (2004 Tax
Year). (a) Schedule for Family with One Child. (b) Schedulefor Family with Two or
More Children.
Source: Eissa, Rothstein, and Nichols (2005). Figure showsthe value of the EITC by wage
level and annual hours worked assuming that there is oneworker in the family and no
other sources of income.
One full-time worker
(2080 hours) 5000-Behavioral Responses to Taxes 83
Zahradnik 2004). The extent to which this istrue wifi depend on the
EITC's incidence, however.
An important observation about the EITC is thatthe credit is based
on annual earnings. As a result, its relationship to a worker's hourly
wage is indirect. Figure 3.3 shows exposure to the credit at differentan-
nual hours worked and hourlywages. Among full-time workers, those
earning the minimum wage receive the maximumcredit, while those
earning $15 per hour would just miss eligibifity.Moreover, the greater
generosity of the program for two-child families impliesthat slightly
higher-wage families would be eligible for the credit.This indirect rela-
tionship has implications for the interpretation of theempirical evi-
dence. We return to this issue in Section 6.
3.The EITC Population
IRS Statistics of Income (SOT) reportscan be used to provide a profile
of the EITC recipient population. Here,we present tabulations of the
2001 Statistics of Income Public Use Tax File, whichis a nationally rep-
resentative sample of all individual tax returns filedin tax year 2001.
The file consists of a total of 143,221 records (InternalRevenue Service
2004). We use the tax file data to present tabulationsof EITC recipients
and costs by filing status, number of children,and earned income.
In 2001, there were a total of 20 million EITCrecipients costing a to-
tal of $33.3 bfflion. In table 3.3,we present tabulations of these recipi-
ents and claims according to number of qualifying childrenand filing
status. The results show that the number of EITCreturns is about
evenly split between those withone child versus two or more children.
Owing to the more generous credit for larger families,however, filers
with two or more children receive 61percent of total EITC dollars
(refunds and tax expenditures), while those withone child receive 37
percent of expenditures (the remaining 2 percent funds thesmall credit
for childless filers). The first panel of table3.3 also shows that single
and head of household filers represent fullythree-quarters of EITC
returns and expenditures, while married couples filing jointly makeup
the remaining quarter. This disproportionate share ofunmarried filers
among the EITC population reflects the higher eligibility ratesdue
to lower earnings and incomeof singlewomen with children. The
third panel of table 3.3 presents theaverage EITC credit amount by fil-
ing status and number of children. Theaverage credit amount rises
sharply with number of children$2,459 for thosewith two or more84 Eissa and Hoynes
Table 3.3
Percentage Distribution of EITC Returns and Claimsby Filing Status and Number of
Qualifying Children, 2001
Source: Tabulations from Tax Policy Center, UrbanInstitute, using 2001 Statistics of In-
come Public Use Tax File.
a includes individuals who file as single.
children compared to $1,578 for thosewith one childreflecting the
more generous schedulefor families with two or more children. In
addition, average EITC claims for single parentsexceed average pay-
ments to married couples filingjointly. As above, this reflects the
higher incomes of married couples.
Table 3.4 presents the percentage distributionof returns and ex-
penditures for tax ifiers with children byEITC bracket, using 2001
SOT data. This distribution is the criticaldeterminant of the net labor
supply effect of the EITC and its expansion(see discussion in the next
section). The table shows that about one-quarterof EITC head of
household returns and expenditures go to filers inthe subsidy (phase-
in) region of the credit. Far fewer marriedcouples (about 15 percent)
have income that place them in that regionof the credit, however. It is
useful to separate single and marriedfilers because the design of the
EITC can generate very different laborsupply incentives for these two
populations. In general, most EITC tax returns arelocated in the
phase-out region of the credit. This isespecially true for married cou-
ples where about half of head ofhousehold and more than two-thirds
of married couples are in the phase-outregion. EITC expenditures
Number of Qualitfying Children
None One Two or More
Percentage distribution of EITC returns
Head of household filersa 16% 33% 28%
Married filing joint filers 2% 7% 14%
All filers 18% 40% 42%
Percentage distribution of total EITC claims
Head of household filersa 2% 32% 43%
Married filing joint filers 0% 6% 17%
All filers 2% 37% 61%
Average EITC claim
Head of household filersa $205 $1,615 $2,612
Married filing joint filers $205 $1,403 $2,144
All ifiers $205 $1,578 $2,459Behavioral Responses to Taxes 85
Table 3.4
Distribution of EITC Recipients and Claims by EITCRange, 2001
Notes: Tabulatiom from Tax Policy Center, UrbanInstitute, using 2001 Statistics of In-
come Public Use Tax File.
show broadly the same pattern, thoughthe distribution is slightly
more evenly spread across the regions. Aboutone-quarter of EITC ben-
efits for head of household filersgo to those in the subsidy region,
while about 40-50 percent of benefitsgo to those in the phase-out re-
gion. Among married couples, the data show only15 percent of dollars
benefit those with the lowest income, whilemore thar half of the dol-
lars go those in the phase-out region.
The SOl reports include a very limitedset of observable characteris-
tics of EITC recipients. We expandour discussion by presenting a pic-
ture of the EITC population usingsurvey data, which represents the
data used in essentially all evaluationsof the labor supply effects of
the credit. In particular,we provide demographic characteristics of
single motherswho represent the largestgroup of EITC recipients.
Eissa, Kieven, and Kreiner (EKK) (2004)provide summary statistics
for a sample of single mothersage 18-49 from the 1986, 1991, 1994,
and 2001 March Current Population Surveys(CPS), covering income
and earnings data for the prior calendaryear-1985, 1990, 1993, and
2000. The results (presented in table 3.5) showthat the typical single
mother during this period is in her early thirties,with a high school
EITC Range
Phase-in Flat Phase-out All
Percentage distribution of EITC recipients by EITCrange
Head of household filers
One child 23% 25% 52% 100%
Two or more children 28% 15% 57% 100%
Married filing joint filers
One child 14% 22% 64% 100%
Two or more children 15% 10% 75% 100%
Percentage distribution of EITC claims by EITCrange
Head of household filers
One child 21% 37% 42% 100%
Two or more children 27% 23% 50% 100%
Married filing joint filers
One child 14% 37% 49% 100%
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Behavioral Responses to Taxes 87
diploma, and fewer than two children. In 2000,83 percent of single
mothers between the ages of 18 and 49 in the CPSare working, on av-
erage, 1,426 hours per year at $11.24 per hour. The data also showthat
the demographic characteristics of thetypical eligible single mother
have changed little over the period that theEITC has been expanded.
Between 1985 and 2000, the typical single motheris aging somewhat
over the 15-year periodby just under a year anda halfand has
fewer children and more education. Themost striking change for sin-
gle mothers during this period is clearly theincrease in labor supply,
observed along both the margin of participationand hours worked.
4.Expected Effects of the EITC
In this section, we examine the impact of thecredit on labor supply
and discuss the expected impactson the extensive (employment) and
intensive (hours worked by working individuals) margins.7The partic-
ipation and hours incentives are modeled assumingthat taxpayers face
no labor market restrictions in their choice of hours, given the (fixed)
offered wage.8 For simplicity,we consider first the case of an un-
married taxpayer and then extend the analysisto examine labor supply
incentives for married couples.
4.1Unmarried Taxpayers
Because the EITC is available only to taxpayers withearned income,
standard labor supply theory predicts that the EITC willencourage
labor force participation among singleparents. The stylized budget
constraint, in figure 3.4, shows this impact graphically.
The figure plots hours worked (horizontal axis)against income
(vertical axis), ignoring for simplicity all other featuresof the tax-
transfer system that affect single parents.9 In theabsence of the EITC,
the taxpayer earns a grosswage w for each hour workedhence, the
no-EITC budget constraint is given bysegment AD, with slope w. The
EITC alters the budget constraint to ABCD. In thephase-in region
(AB), the EITC acts as a pure wage subsidy andincreases the net wage
from w to w(1 + r) wherer is the subsidy rate (40 percent for tax-
payers with two or more children and 34 percent for taxpayerswith
one child in 2004). In the flat region of the credit (BC), thetaxpayer's
budget constraint is shifted outan amount equal to the maximum
credit ($2,604 for taxpayers withone child and $4,300 for taxpayers








Stylized Budget Constraint for the EITC
hourly wage is w. Each dollar earned inthe phaseout region of the
EITC (CD) reduces the credit by aphaseout rate of rp (about 21 per-
cent). The net wage earned by the taxpayerin this region, w(1 -
may be reduced even further oncethe taxpayer starts paying federal
tax. This figure is drawn to reflect thefact that the phase-out region of
the credit is much larger than thephase-in region. For example, for a
single woman with two children in 2004,the phase-in region spans
about $10,000 (from $0 to $10,750)while the phase-out region spans
about $20,000 (from $14,040 to $34,458).
The figure shows that the well-being of a taxpayerwho is not work-
ing is not affected by the EITC. Any taxpayerwho preferred working
before will stifi prefer working, and some taxpayers mayfind that the
additional after-tax income from the EITCmakes it worth entering
the labor force. Therefore, the impact ofintroducing or expanding the
EITC on the labor force participation ofunmarried taxpayers is un-
ambiguously positive.
The impact of the EITC on the hoursworked by a single working tax-
payer, however, depends onwhich region of the credit the taxpayer is
in before the credit is expanded orintroduced. If she is in the phase-in
region, the EITC leads to an ambiguous impact onhours worked due
B
Phase-in region
Slope = w(1 +r)
0
Hours of work
88 Eissa and HoynesBehavioral Responses to Taxes 89
Table 3.6
Average Tax Rates for Hypothetical Single Women with Children (2004Tax Law): Taxes
Calculated with and Without the EITC






Average Tax Rates with the EITC
Entry to Entry toPT to
PT WorkFT WorkFT Work
Average Tax Rates Without the
EITC
Entry toEntry toPT to
PT Work FT Work FT Work
Notes: Calculated using TA)(SIM. Numbers represent theaverage tax rate associated
with increasing labor supply (either from no work to workor from part-time (PT) to full-
time (PT) work). Taxes include all federal income taxes plus the payrolltax (assuming the
individual bears the entire 15.3% rate). Part-time work is assumedto be 20 hours per
week and 52 weeks per year, and full-time work is assumed to be 40 hoursper week and
52 weeks per year.
to the negative income effect and positive substitution effect. Inthe flat
region, however, the EITC producesa negative income effect, leading
to an unambiguous reduction in hours worked. In the phase-outre-
gion, the EITC produces a negative income and negative substitution
effect, leading again to an unambiguous reductionin hours worked.
Moreover, the phase-out of the credit alters the budgetset in such a
way that some taxpayers with incomes beyond the phase-out region
may choose to reduce their hours of work and take advantage of the
credit. Recall from table 3.4 above that about three-quartersof single
EITC recipients have earnings in the flat and phase-outregion of the
creditthus, the expectation is that the EITC will reducethe number
of hours worked by most eligible single taxpayers alreadyin the labor
force.
To illustrate how the EITC affects the incentives faced by singletax-
payers, table 3.6 presents average tax rates faced by hypothetical single
19% 9% 1% 15% 15% 15%
18% 3% 12% 15% 12% 12%
10% 7% 23% 15% 14% 14%
7% 13% 33% 14% 16% 16%
3% 19% 41% 12% 19% 19%
B. Single taxpayer with two or more children (by hourlywage level)
$5.15/hour 25% 25% 25% 15% 15% 15%
$7.50/hour 25% 13% 2% 15% 12% 12%
$10/hour 25% 3% 18% 15% 10% 10%
$12/hour 21% 3% 26% 14% 11% 11%
$15/hour 13% 12% 38% 12% 14% 14%90 Eissa and Hoynes
taxpayers earning different wage rates,with different family sizes.
These calculations are based on the NationalBureau of Economic
Research (NBER) TA)(SIM model and cover allfederal income taxes
and payroll taxes under 2004 law.'° We calculate averagetax rates for
three cases: (1) moving from no work to part-timework (20 hours per
week, 52 weeks per year); (2) moving from nowork to full-time work
(40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year); and(3) moving from part-
time to full-time work. The average tax rates arecalculated with the
EITC (columns 1-3) and without the EITC (columns4-6). The tax rates
are calculated for women with onechild and women with two or more
children to reflect the different EITC schedulesand for women over a
range of wage rates from thefederal minimum ($5.15) to $15 per hour.
These calculations show that the EITC reduces average taxrates of
entering (part- and full-time) work across allfamily sizes and all wage
levels, thereby illustrating the prediction thatparticipation should
unambiguously increase for single parents. The impactof the EITC on
these tax rates for entering work can be sizable, evenfor higher-wage
women. For example, in tax year2004, a woman earning $10 per hour
with two children faces a -25 percent average taxrate (subsidy) for
entering work at part-time levels and a -3 percent averagetax rate
(subsidy) for entering work at full-time levels.In the absence of an
EITC, the same woman would face average tax ratesof 15 percent and
10 percent, respectively. The results showthat the impacts of the EITC
are greatest for lower-wage women(with more earnings in the phase-
in region), for part-time entrants, and for womenwith two or more
children.
The table also ifiustrates how the EITC penalizesincreasing work
for those already in the work force. If a womanwith two children,
earning $10 per hour, were to increasework from part- to full-time,
however, she faces an average tax rate of 18 percentwith the EITC
(due to the phase-out rate) compared to 10 percentwithout the EITC.
This work disincentive on the intensive(hours) margin exists for all
but the lowest-wage women (who even atfull-time work are not yet in
the phase-out region of the credit).
In addition to these tax rates for hypothetical taxpayers,Eissa,
Kieven, and Kreiner (2004) use their CPS sampleof single mothers for
1985, 1990, 1993, and 2000 and calculate averageand marginal tax
rates (using TAXSIM) at observed earnings.The results are presented
in the bottom of table 3.5 (presentedearlier)and their results show
that the average tax rates declined consistently overthe period, fromBehavioral Responses to Taxes 91
14.5 percent in 1985 to a negative 4.1percent in 2000. It is notable that
the time series change in the marginaltax rate is more moderate and
less systematic than that of theaverage tax rate. Note that these tax
rates wifi vary over time due to changes in tax policy(the EITC and all
other income tax changes), and also with changesin the earnings and
family size of their sample of singlewomen.
EKK also isolate the impact of the federaltax reforms (again EITC
and non-EITC tax changes)on tax rates by imputing a post-reform tax
rate at given pre-reform characteristics. These results(labeled "Effect of
tax act" in table 3.5) show that all tax acts since1986 have reduced
both the average and marginal taxrates faced by single taxpayers and
have generally reduced tax liability (averagetax rates) more signifi-
cantly than marginal tax rates. The largest reductionin tax rates is due
to OBRA93.
4.2Married Taxpayers
In contrast to the predictions for singlewomen, the EITC is expected to
reduce the participation and hours worked ofmost eligible married
women. This occurs also because the credit is basedon family earnings
and income. Suppose family labor supply followsa sequential model,
with the husband as the primaryearner and the wife as the secondary
earner. In this model, the effect of the credit on the labor supply ofpri-
mary earners is the same as that of single taxpayersincentivesto par-
ticipate in the labor market strengthen unambiguously,while hours of
work incentives are ambiguous, though theyare likely negative given
the distribution of taxpayer income along theEITC schedule.
The impact of the EJTC on secondaryearners is more complicated
because it depends on the earnings of the primaryearner. Assume for
simplicity that the husband is the primaryearner and further that his
earnings place the family in the phase-out range.11The family receives
the credit if the wife remains out of the laborforce, but the credit
amount will decrease with each dollar earned if sheenters the labor
market. In the phase-out range, therefore, the EJTCunambiguously
reduces hours worked and participation byraising family income and
reducing the net-of-tax wage. If the husband'searnings place the fam-
ily in the flat region, the credit unambiguouslylowers labor-market
participation and hours worked by marriedwomen (through a pure
income effect). Of course, it is also possible for thewife's work effort to
increase the family's credit if the husband's earningsare in the subsidy
region (up to $7,660 or $10,750 in 2004, dependingon the number ofEissa and Hoynes 92
Table 3.7
Average Tax Rates for Hypothetical MarriedWomen with Children (2004 Tax Law):
Taxes Calculated with and Without the EITC
Average Tax Rates with the Average Tax Rates Without the
EITC E1TC
No WorkNo Work No Work No Work
to PT to FT PT to to PT to FT PT to
Work Work FT WorkWork Work FT Work
Married women with one child (by hourly wage)
Married women with two or more children (by hourlywage)
Note: Calculated using TAXSIM. Numbersrepresent the average tax rate associated
with increasing labor supply (either from nowork to work or from part-time to full-time
work). For each calculation, the husband is assumed tobe working full-time and full-year
at the same hourly wage as the wife. Taxesinclude all federal income taxes plus the pay-
roll tax (assuming the individual bears the entire15.3% rate). Part-time work is assumed
to be 20 hours per week and 52weeks per year, and full-time work is assumed to be40
hours per week and 52 weeks per year.
children), but very few married couples arelikely to have incomes in
this range.
The impact of the EITC on thelabor supply of married couples
therefore depends on the distribution offamily income along the
schedule, the distribution of earnings withinthe household, and the
relative elasticities of labor supply withrespect to taxes. Secondary
earners whose spouseshave earnings in the flat and phase-out regions
should be less likely to work andshould work fewer hours, while
those whose spouses have income inthe phase-in region should be
more likely to work but canincrease or reduce their hoursworked.
Given the distribution of income, it isunlikely the EITC wifi have any
positive effect on the labor supply ofmarried women.
To ifiustrate the work incentivesfor married women, table 3.7
presents average tax rates (usingTA)(SIM) similar to those presented
$5.15/hour 8% 18% 27% 5% 8% 11%
$7.50/hour 30% 36% 41% 14% 20% 25%
$10/hour 41% 35% 30% 25% 27% 29%
$12/hour 35% 33% 30% 27% 29% 30%
$15/hour 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
$5.15/hour 9% 18% 26% 5% 5% 5%
$7.50/hour 26% 32% 39% 5% 11% 18%
$10/hour 36% 36% 36% 14% 21% 28%
$12/hour 41% 36% 30% 23% 27% 30%
$15/hour 34% 32% 30% 29% 29% 30%Behavioral Responses to Taxes 93
above for single women. Again the tablepresents average tax rates for
entering and increasing work, including andexcluding the EITC, and
for a range of wages and family sizes. Thesecalculations also require
an assumption about the earnings of the husband. Weassume that the
husband's labor supply is fixed at full-timework and that he earns the
same hourly wage as his wife. There are two striking observationsfrom
the table. First, average tax ratesare everywhere higher for married
women with the EITC compared to without the EITC. Forexample, a
woman earning $10 per hour with two children who workspart-time
faces a 36 percent average tax rate with theEITC and a 14 percent tax
rate without the EITC. The work disincentiveimpacts of the EITC
extend quite high into the wage distribution,reflecting the high break-
even earnings point in the EITC ($31,338 for those withone child and
$35,458 for those with twoor more children in 2004). Our assumption
of full-time work by the husband implies thatour calculations do not
show any positive participation incentiveseven for women with very
low-earning husbands. With employmentrates for low-educated mar-
ried men approaching 95 percentor higher, however, those facing pos-
itive incentives are likely to bea small group of women (Eissa and
Hoynes 2004).
Second, married women with children facemuch higher marginal
tax rates compared to single women with children.This occurs in part
because the federal tax schedule isprogressive, although calculations
(in tables 3.6 and 3.7) show that the EITCplays an important role. The
role of increasing marginal tax rates has beendiscussed in the taxes
and labor supply literature more broadly (e.g.,Eissa 1995), but there is
less discussion of the EITC in this setting.
5.What Have We Learned About Labor Supplyand the EITC?
A large body of work has examined both thedistributional impacts
and the behavioral responses to the earnedincome tax credit, including
labor supply, family formation, andconsumption. Perhaps because of
its explicit goal of encouraging work, thebulk of this evidence has
been on labor supply. Our goal in this discussionis to summarize the
major findings in the literature and to discusstheir implications for
the design of tax-transfer programs. Readersinterested in a more ex-
haustive summary should see the comprehensivereview by Hotz and
Scholz (2003).94 Eissa and Hoynes
To presage the main findings,there is overwhelming evidence that
the EITC encourages work amongsingle mothers but little evidence
that eligible-working women adjusttheir hours of work in response to
the EITC. Perhaps most strikingabout these findings is their con-
sistency across different empiricalmethodsincluding both quasi-
experimental methods (Eissa and Liebman1996; Eissa and Hoynes
2004; Hotz, Mul]in, and Scholz2002) and more structural methods
(Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 1995; Meyerand Rosenbaum 2001)as
well as different EITC expansions.
To interpret and compare theempirical results, we first clarify
the different sources of identifyingvariation. While all individuals face
the same tax schedule at any pointin time, they face different tax
rates based on their filing (i.e.,family) status, family size (number of
children), non-labor income, andearned income (wages and hours
worked). Additionally, tax schedules,and therefore rates, vary over
time with policy reforms. Themain difference between the quasi-
experimental approach and more structuralmethods is the use of
group versus individual-levelvariation in taxes. The first approach
assumes that all relevant wageand income changes are captured by
group level variation infamily type and size (presence andnumber of
children) and time. The EITC effect isthe change in employment (rela-
tive to that of childless women)of women with children after the EITC
expansion. To the extent that tax rates, wages,and incomes are mea-
sured with error, this groupingapproach reduces any measurement
error bias in the coefficientsof interest.
Most studies take advantage of thelarge federal expansions in the
credit in 1986, 1990, and 1993 thataffected incentives for single and
married women with children. To controlfor other factors that may be
contemporaneous with thepolicy changes, many studies utilizecontrol
groups and estimatedifference-in-difference models. The EITCdesign
and expansions suggest a number ofpossible strategiessuch as com-
paring women with different familysizes (presence and number of
children), marital status, earnings, oreducation levelsfor identifying
labor supply responses. Thesemodels seem to work well and provide
robust estimates for the impact of theEITC on participation, but they
may be less well suitedfor estimating the impacts on hoursworked.
Analyzing the determinants of hoursworked is more complicated due
to the changes in the compositionof the working sample and the endo-
geneity of work more generally. We returnto this final point in SectionBehavioral Responses to Taxes 95
6. First, however, we review the empiricalevidence on different mar-
gins of labor supply and for differentgroups.
5.1The EITC and the Labor Supplyof Single Taxpayers
5.1.1Labor Force ParticipationThe discussion of labor supply
above shows that the EITC is expectedto increase the participation of
single women with children andreduce the hours worked for thema-
jority of those already in the labor force.Several papers have estimated
the impact of the EITCon employment decisions of singlewomen
(Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 1995; Eissaand Liebman 1996; Eliwood
2000; Grogger 2003; Hotz et al. 2002;Keane and Moffitt 1998; Meyer
and Rosenbaun-i 2000, 2001; Rothstein2005), all consistently finding
that the EITC increased their labor forceparticipation.
Several papers estimate difference-in-differencemodels applied to a
single expansion or multiple expansions ofthe EITC. In these models,
changes in the employment rate of thetreatment or eligible group (sin-
gle women with children) iscompared to the change in the employ-
ment rate of a control or unaffectedgroup. This approach is used by
Eissa and Liebman (EL 1996), Ellwood(2000), Hotz et al. (2002), Meyer
and Rosenbaum (MR 2000), and Rothstein(2005). The most common
control group is childless singlewomen (EL 1996, MR 2000, Rothstein
2005). Other comparisons exploit differentfeatures of the design of the
EITC. Ellwood (2000) and Rothstein(2005) use the fact that the shape
of the credit implies different incentivesat different hourly wages and
compare single mothers at different wageor skifi levels. EL (1996),
Hotz et al. (2002), and Meyer andRosenbaum (2000) exploit the second
child marginal credit andcompare single women with one versus
those with two or more children.
To illustrate the findings from thedifference-in-difference literature,
figure 3.5 presents annual employmentrates for women over the pe-
riod 1984-2003. We show the employmentrates for four groups: single
women with children, single women without children,married women
with children, and marriedwomen without children. We use the March
CPS, where employment is definedby any work over the calendar
year, for these calculations.'2 The figure shows the dramaticincrease
in employment rates for singlewomen with children compared to
single women without children. Forexample, between 1984 and 2003,
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Figure 3.5
Annual Employment Rates for Women byMarital Status and Presence of Children,
1984-2003.
Notes: Calculations are based on the1985-2004 March CPS and include women age19-
44, not in school and not disabled. Italso excludes women with positive earningsbut
zero hours and those withpositive hours and zero earnings. Married womeninclude
those with spouse present, and single womeninclude divorced, widowed, and never
married women. Figure shows the fractionof women who worked at all in thecalendar
year.
pointsfrom 73 percent in 1984 to85 percent in 2003. Most of this
change occurred between 1992and 1999, when employment rates
increased by 16 percentage points.This is during the period of the
largest expansion in the EITC due toOBRA93. Over this same period,
there was little change in employmentrates of single women without
children.
Several authors (Ellwood 2000, Rothstein2005, Meyer and Rosen-
baum 2000) find that the groupwith the most to gain from EITC
expansions (e.g., women with lower wages,lower education levels,
more children, andsingle women) experienced largergains in employ-
ment rates. To illustrate thesefindings, the next two figures reproduce
results from Meyer and Rosenbaum(2000) and Rothstein (2005).
Figure 3.6 reproduces Meyerand Rosenbaum's (2000)difference-in-
difference estimates of employment ratesfor three comparisons
single mothers and single womenwithout children, single mothers
and black men, and singlemothers and married motherswhereU--- Single mothers minus single women without children -zSingle mothers minus black men














Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Annual Employment Rates,Single Mothers Versus
Control Groups, 1984-1996.
Source: Reproduced from Meyer and Rosenbauin (2000),Figure 9.
Treatment group includes single womenage 19-44 from the March CPS for 1985-1997.
Each line represents the difference in employmentrates between the treatment group
(single mothers) and one of three controlgroups. The estimates are from a probit model
that controls for demographic variables, residential location,unearned income, state un-
employment rate (and its interactions with single mother andeducation level), state and
year fixed effects.
the difference is normalized to 0 in 1984.13 Thefigure shows that
single mothers' employment increased relativeto each of these control
groups, and the gains are well timed to the expansions of theEITC in
1986, 1990, and 1993. Figure 3.7, reproducedfrom Rothstein (2005),
extends the single-motherversuschi1dlesssinglewornancomparison
and estimates difference-in-difference models of the1993 expansion by
wage level. The figure shows that employment increased withOBRA93
for all single mothers relative to childlesswomen and, as expected, the
impacts decrease with the woman'swage.
Another approach recognizes that tax-transferpolicy has non-
neutral effects within groups anduses individual variation in net wages
and net non-labor income. Consequently,identification is based on
cross-sectional and time variation in the EITC andfederal taxes. For ex-
ample, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001)use instead state-time variation
in labor supply incentives andmeasure the gains to work from wages,
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Figure 3.7
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of OBRA93 onAnnual Employment Rates, by Wage
Level, Single Mothers Versus Single Womenwithout Children.
Source: Reproduced from Rothstein (2005),Figure 10.
The sample includes women age 19-64 from theMarch CPS. The pre-OBRA93 period is
1992-1993, and the post-OBRA93 period is 1996-1997.Each line represents the difference
in employment rates between the treatment group(single mothers with one or two or
more children) and the control group(single women without children). The estimates
are from a semi-parametricmodel that controls for education, potential experience,race!
ethnicity, number and presence of children, andresidence.
net of federal and state taxes,and transfer benefits (AFDC/TANF,food
stamps, and Medicaid).14
Overall these studies suggest a strong positiverelationship between
the EITC and employment ratesof single women with children.
Further, the results are remarkably consistent acrossdifferent policy
expansions, different control groups,and different methodologies. The
estimated size of the labor supply effectdiffers depending on the par-
ticular expansion considered. Eissaand Liebman (1996) find that the
1986 expansion of the EITC led to a2.8 percentage point increase in
participation (out of a base of 74.2) forsingle mothers. Meyer and
Rosenbaum (2001) find that 60 percent of the8.7 percentage point in-
crease in annual employmentof single mothers between 1984 and
1996 is due to the EITC. They find that asmaller amount, 35 percent of
the increase in participation between1992 and 1996, is due to the EITC
(with the remainder due to welfarereform and other changes). The
range of the implied laborforce participation elasticity with respect to
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Figure 3.8
Average Annual Hours Worked for Working Single Women by Presence of Children,
1984-2003.
Notes: Calculations based on the 1985-2004 March CPS and include singlewomen age
19-44, not in school, not disabled, and who worked at all during the calendaryear. It
also excludes women with positive earnings but zero hours and those withpositive
hours and zero earnings. Single women include divorced, widowed, andnever married
women. Figure shows average annual hours worked conditional on working.
5.1.2Hours Worked The EITC is expected to unambiguouslyre-
duce hours worked by the vast majority of eligible workers. In sharp
contrast to the findings above, however, there is little evidence consis-
tent with this prediction.
A limited set of papers have examined the impact of the EITCon the
hours worked by single mothers. This is in part because estimating the
hours worked response of workers to the EITC budget constraint is fun-
damentally a harder empirical problem. In particular,one has to deal
with the selection of individuals into the labor force. Eissa and Lieb-
man (1996) apply their difference-in-difference model to annual hours
worked (conditional on working) and find a small positive (andmar-
ginally significant) impact on all single mothers anda zero impact on
low-educated single mothers. Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999) find
mixed (positive and negative) but insignificant impacts of the EITCon
hours worked (conditional on working). Rothstein (2005) findsno dif-
ference between single mothers and childless singlewomen in weekly
hours worked (conditional on working) across thewage distribution.
Keane and Moffitt (1998) estimate a structural model of labor supply
choice and simulate the effect of the EITCon total hours but do not
present a separate estimate for those already working.
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Figure 3.9
Average Annual Hours Worked for Single Women in thePhase-out Region of the EITC,
1984-2003, by Presence of Children.
Notes: Calculations based on the 1985-2004 March CPS andinclude single women age
19-44, not in school, and not disabled. The figure also excludes womenwith positive
earnings but zero hours and those with positive hours and zeroearnings. Single women
include divorced, widowed, and never married women. Thefigure shows average an-
nual hours worked for the sample of single women who have earningswithin $1,000 of
the 1996 phase-out region of the EITC (in real terms).
To ifiustrate the findings from the literature, figure 3.8 presents
average hours worked(conditional on working) for working single
women with and without children over1984-2003 using our CPS sam-
ple described above. Consistent with the studiessurveyed, the figure
provides no evidence that hours of work decreased forsingle mothers
relative to single women without children as the EITCexpanded.
Figure 3.9 refines this analysis by focusing on thephase-out region of
the credit where the marginal tax rates are highest.Specifically, the fig-
ure plots average earningsfor single women with earnings within
$1,000 of the 1996 phase-out region of the credit.Consider a single
woman with two children who, in 1984,earned $15,000 per year. At
that time, she was above the EITC breakeven earnings point.After the
1986 expansions, the same woman (at the same real earningslevel)
faced a 10 percent EITC phase-out rate. After the1990 EITC expan-
sions, the phase-out rate she faced was about 14 percent,and finally
after the 1993 expansions the phase-out was up toabout 21 percent.
Single mothers with earnings in this range (which weadjusted for a
change in prices each year) are in the range where the taxrates have
increased the most. Strikingly, figure 3.9 shows no patternof a reduc-
1998 198619881990 199219941996
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Figure 3.10
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Annual Employment Rates, 1984-1996, Married
Mothers Versus Married Women Without Children.
Source: Reproduced from Eissa and Hoynes (2004), Figure 5.
The sample includes married women age 25-54 with less thana high school education
from the March CPS for 1985-1997. The sample excludes couples whereone spouse was
ill or disabled, in the military, or in school full-time during the previousyear. The line
with square markers gives the change (relative to 1984) inaverage annual employment
rates for married women with children compared to married women without children.
The estimates are from a probit model that controls for demographicvariables, state
dummies, state labor market variables, and year effects for bothgroups. The line with cir-
cle markers gives the change (relative to 1984) in theaverage credit calculated for a sec-
ondary earner (the wife) for a fixed (1996) distribution of the husband'searnings.
lion in hours worked for single women with children relativeto single
women without children.
Another source of evidence builds on the prediction from laborsup-
ply theory that taxpayers should be bunched at the kinks in the EITC
schedule (and should be less present at the end of the EITC schedule).
Liebman (1998) and Saez (2002) use tax return data and findno evi-
dence consistent with these predictions. At the end of thissection, we
return to these results and discuss why the literature findsa participa-
tion effect but no hours worked effect.
5.2The EITC and Labor Supply of Married Taxpayers
While the literature on married women and the EITC is limited,
the results are quite consistent with the theoreticalexpectations. In
our earlier work (Eissa and Hoynes 2004), we estimatea difference-
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without children and find that the 1993 EITC expansionled to a one
percentage point reduction in theparticipation rate of married
mothers. These results are ifiustrated in figure3.10, reproduced from
Eissa and Hoynes (2004), which presents estimatesof the change (rela-
tive to 1984) in average employment ratesfor married women with
children compared to married women without children(controlling
for demographics, macroeconomic cycles, and stateand year fixed
effects). For comparison, the figure also shows thechange (relative to
1984) in the average EITC for their sample.This shows that employ-
ment by married mothers declined relative tothat of childless married
women following the 1990 and1993 expansions (though not the 1986
expansion). This finding is consistent with Ellwood(2000) who com-
pares married mothers in high-and low-wage quartiles and finds that
expansions of the EITC are associated with areduction in labor market
participation by married mothers.
We also estimate (in Eissa and Hoynes2004) a reduced form em-
ployment model for married women (as secondaryearners) and
parameterize the impact of the EITC andfederal taxes on after-tax
gains to entering work. We find that the expansionsin the EITC be-
tween 1984 and 1996 led to about a one percentagepoint reduction in
the employment of married mothers. These estimates aresimilar to but
somewhat smaller than our difference-in-difference estimates.
In Eissa and Hoynes (forthcoming), we find thatexpansions in the
EITC are also associated with reductions inhours worked for married
women who are working. We estimatehours of work as a function of
after-tax wages and unearned income, again assuming womenare sec-
ondary earners. We instrument for the after-tax wageusing tax param-
eters. We find that expansions in theEITC from 1984 to 1996 led to a
small, 1 to 4 percent, decrease in annual hoursfor married women
with children. Heim (2005) estimates a structuralmodel of family labor
supply and finds similar impacts on hoursworked of married women
(yet he finds no impact of the EITC on theemployment of married
women).
6.Discussion
6.1 Why Do We Observe a ParticipationEffect but No Hours
Effect?
A consistent and somewhat puzzlingfinding in the empirical literature
on the EITC and labor supply isthe large response of the participation
decision and the lack of any response in thereported hours worked byBehavioral Responses to Taxes 103
taxpayers in the labor force. Here, we focus on single mothers who,as
noted above, represent over three-quarters of EITC recipients.
The puzzle is why no impact on hours worked is found inany eval-
uation of the EITC. Theory suggests that we should observea decline
in the hours worked by all taxpayers beyond the phase-inof the credit.
While the income effect operates to reduce hours workedin the flat re-
gion, both income and substitution effectsoperate to reduce hours
worked in the phase-out region of the credit.
We review several explanations that have been offered. The firstex-
planation is based on a standard finding in theempirical labor supply
literature: the labor supply elasticity falls when estimatedusing a sam-
ple of working (rather than all) women (Mroz 1987, Triest1990). The
implication of this finding is that the participation (extensive)margin
is more responsive than the hours (intensive) margin. Itmay well be
that the hours worked elasticity is too small to beestimated precisely
using quasi-experimental approaches. If, for example, theelasticity of
hours worked by single women with children is 0.3, thenthe 1993
EITC expansion would reduce hours of work by 8 percent.'6It is not
unreasonable to consider this reduction too small to be identifiedem-
pirically, especially given the somewhat crudecomparison-of-means
approach typically used. If this is correct, then thenext question is,
Why is the elasticity on the intensive marginconsistently lower than
the extensive margin?
One reason why there may be no effect of the EITCon hours worked
is that workers are unable to choose continuous hours of work.This
would occur if, for example, workersare bound by institutional restric-
tions or by norms for part- and full-time work.17 Toexamine the valid-
ity of this explanation, figure 3.11 presents the distribution ofannual
hours worked for our CPS sample of single mothers in 1986,1990,
1993, and 2000. (Note this includes all single mothers and, inparticu-
lar, is not limited to those with earnings in the EITCeligible range.)
Two observations are worth noting. First, annual hoursare highly con-
centrated at full-time work. While some single mothers workpart-time
(primarily part-year), the majority of single mothers workfull-time
(full year). Second, the increase in employmentmirrors the increase in
full-time, full-year work. One (testable) interpretation ofthis trend is
that new workers enter the labor market at full-timeworkconsistent
with a labor supply model with large fixed costs of work.
Another reason why no hours-worked effect has beenestimated
is that reported hours in the survey dataare measured with error
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Kernel Density Estimate of Annual Hours, Single Mothers.
Source: Reproduced from Eissa, Kieven, and Kreiner(2004).
The figure uses the March CPS sample of single womenwith children, age 19-44, not in
school, and not disabled. It also excludes women with positiveearnings but zero hours
and those with positive hours and zero earnings. Single womeninclude divorced, wid-
owed, and never married women. The figure provides asmoothed estimate of the distri-
bution of annual hours worked (nonworkers haveannual hours equal to 0).
Annual hours of work are typically constructed asthe product of
weeks worked last year times usual hoursworked per week last year.
Other than standard recall error, individualswith varying weekly
hours may make errors in averaging.
Finally, taxpayers may not be fully aware of the structureof the
EITC schedule. Almost all taxpayers receive theEITC as a lump sum
payment with their annual tax return(Friedman 2000), and therefore
have little opportunity to learn about thefeatures of the credit. This
may be especially truefor the phase-out region of the credit, in part be-
cause of the confounding effectsof non-EITC federal income taxes. This
EITC structure and its delivery are in contrast to themonthly reporting
period in welfare programs and to the weekly orbiweekly paycheck
and its opportunities for learning aboutFICA or ordinary income
taxes. Further, informal and formal surveysof people eligible for the
EITC suggest that knowledge about thecredit is relatively high,Behavioral Responses to Taxes 105
though by no means universal (Liebman 1998, Phillips 2001, Smeeding
et al. 2000, Romich and Weisner 2000). Phillips, for example, finds that
about 66 percent of families nationally had heard of the EITC. There is
scant evidence, however, that those likely eligible for the credit under-
stand its structure or the different incentives implied.
6.2Implications for Optimal Tax and Welfare
The finding that labor force participation responses are more signifi-
cant than hours worked responses has several important implications
for the design of tax-transfer programs and the welfare evaluation of
taxation. Recent work has shown that accounting for labor force partic-
ipation responses can change the optimal transfer program (Saez 2002).
More precisely, this work has shown that with sufficiently high partici-
pation elasticities, the optimal tax-transfer scheme can be similar to the
EITCwith negative marginal tax rates at the bottom of the earnings
distribution. On the other hand, an EITC would be inefficient in a stan-
dard model with only intensive (hours worked) responses.'8
Liebman (2002) extends this work by examining more closely the
optimal design of the EITC. He uses a micro-simulation model cali-
brated to 1999 CPS data to illustrate the trade-offs in the design of an
EITCincluding the optimal maximum credit, phase-in and phase-
out rateswith fixed costs and participation effects. Liebman finds
that the efficiency cost of transferring income through the EITC is
substantially lower than previous studies have found, in large part be-
cause of the participation response of single mothers and the associ-
ated reduced welfare spending. His simulations suggest a cost of less
than $2 to provide a transfer worth $1 to EITC recipients.
Eissa, Eleven, and Kreiner (2005) take a different approach and ex-
amine the impact of participation responses on the welfare evaluation
of actual tax reforms. They extend the standard framework for welfare
evaluation of tax reforms to account for discrete labor market entry
by way of non-convexities in preferences and budget sets. Such non-
convexities are significant because they allow first-order welfare effects
along the extensive (participation) margin. EKK simulate the effects of
the 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2001 tax acts in the United States and show
that each had different effects on tax rates along the intensive and ex-
tensive margins. The 1993 EITC expansion, for example, reduced the
tax rates on labor force participation but increased the marginal tax
rates on hours worked for most workers. The authors show that con-
flating these two tax rates in welfare analysis can be fundamentally106 Eissa and Hoynes
misleading. For tax reforms that change average tax rates differently
than marginal tax rates (such as the 1993 expansion of the EITC),
ignoring the participation margin can lead to even the wrong sign of
the welfare effect.
6.3Incidence
Understanding the effects of the EITC on wages is directly relevant to
evaluating the effectiveness of the EITC and its longer-run effects of
labor supply. If the EITC reduces gross wages below what they would
have been otherwise, the credit may do little, if anything, to encourage
labor supply, and may operate to the primary benefit of low-wage
employers.
Recent work by Leigh (2004) and Rothstein (2005) directly examine
the effect of the EITC on pre-tax wages, using very different methods.
Leigh uses variation across states in the presence and generosity of
state EITC add-ons and finds a very strong negative effect of the credit
on wages, implying very little benefit of thecredit for its recipients.
One drawback to Leigh's approach is that state EITCs are small rela-
tive to the federal program, and many recipients may not be aware of
their existence. As a consequence, behavioral responses may be muted,
making it difficult to identify the incidence of the credit. Rothstein uses
variation from the 1993 federal credit expansion along the wage distri-
bution and finds that low-skifi women's wages actually increased
slightly even as their labor force participation increased. These results
imply an upward-sloping demand curve, though they are by no means
sufficiently precise to reject a small downward slope. One possible
explanation for the conflicting findings of the Leigh and Rothstein
studies is the different sources of identification. Clearly more work
needs to done to increase our understanding of the broader labor mar-
ket effects of the E1TC.
7.Conclusions
An unusual feature of the EITC is its explicit goal to use the tax system
to encourage and support those who choose to work. A large body of
work has evaluated the labor supply effects of the EITC and has gener-
ated several important findings regarding behavioral response to taxes.
This paper reviews this empirical literature and focuses on two main
lessons. It argues that perhaps the main lesson learned from the evi-
dence is the confirmation that real responses to taxes are important;Behavioral Responses to Taxes 107
labor supply does respond to the EITC. The second major lesson is re-
lated to the nature of the labor supply response, namely, that the re-
sponse is concentrated along the extensive (entry) margin rather than
the intensive (hours worked) margin. We discuss different explana-
tions of this pattern of labor supply responses and its implications for
the optimal design of tax-transfer programs and for the welfare evalua-
tion of tax reforms.
Empirical evidence suggests that transferring dollars to the needy
using an EITCrather than a negative income taxmay be optimal.
This evidence cannot yet support more precise judgments about the
optimal design of the EITC, however. That would requireamong
other thingsidentifying the hours of work response of workers to
the EITC.
Notes
This paper was prepared for the Tax Policy and the Economy conference held on Septem-
ber 15, 2005, in Washington, D.C. We wish to thank Jim Poterba for very useful com-
ments, Bruce Meyer and Jesse Rothstein for providing us with data, Dan Feenberg for
special tabulations from TA)(SIIvI, Jeff Rohaly of the Urban Institute for tabulations of
SOl data, and Alan Barreca for research assistance.
By comparison, federal spending on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),
which provides block grants for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
stands at about $18.6 billion (Hotz and Scholz 2003).
Our analysis of married couples focuses on married women because they have been
found to be considerably more responsive to changes in wages and income than married
men.
Beginning in 1994, a small credit is available to low-income workers without children.
See Eissa and Liebman (1996) for a more extensive discussion of EITC rules.
TRA86 returned the real maximum credit to its 1975 level and indexed the EITC for
inflation.
Legislation adopting a state EITC in Virginia was passed in 2004 but will not take ef-
fect until January 2006. In addition, local governments in Montgomery County, Mary-
land, and Denver, Colorado, offer their own version of EITCs.
Another dimension of labor supply which we do not discuss here is human capital ac-
cumulation. This is examined in Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002) and reviewed in
Hotz and SchoLz (2003).
We discuss later the potential impact of the EITC on wages earned by less-skilled
workers.
An important omission here are means-tested transfers such as AFDC/TANF and
food stamps. These programs have large implicit tax rates and create large disincentives108 Eissa and Hoynes
to enter and increase work (Moffitt 1992). Ignoring transfer programs does not affect the
qualitative conclusions in this section.
These calculations assume that the individual bears the burden of the entire FICA
tax, with a combined marginal tax rate of 15.3 percent. For these calculations, total taxes
paid equal federal income tax plus the payroll tax less the (nonrefundable and refund-
able) child tax credit and the EITC.
The figures in Eissa and Hoynes (2004) suggest thatmeasured by relative
earningswomen are predominantly secondary earners. In a sample of couples with a
high school education or less, about 90 percent of all wives, and 85 percent of working
wives, earn less than their husbands. In this discussion and in the literature more
broadly, women are assumed to be secondary earners.
We limit the analysis to women age 19-44 who are not in school or disabled. We also
exclude women with positive earnings but zero hours and women with positive hours
and zero earnings. Single women are divorced, separated, widowed, or never married
and married women include those with a spouse present. The results are based on the
CPS survey years 1985-2004.
Meyer and Rosenbaum's (2000) estimates are based on a sample from the March CPS
for 1984-1996. The estimates are from a probit model that includes controls for demo-
graphic variables, residential location, unearned income, state unemployment rate (and
its interactions with single mother and education level), and state and year fixed effects.
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) also control for welfare reform variables and state
spending on educational training, job search assistance, and child care assistance for
AFDC recipients. The gains to work are obtained by integrating over the empirical distri-
bution of wages and hours worked for working women and calculating net income at
each wage-hours possibffity.
This range excludes the estimates from Hotz et al. (2002). Their studies differ from the
others in that their sample is limited to welfare recipients (or prior recipients).
The 1993 expansion in the EITC increased the phase-out rate to 21.06 (15.98) percent
from 13.93 (13.21) percent for families with one child (two or more children). Assuming
the woman faces a 15 percent marginal tax rate and the full 15.30 percent PICA rate, this
implies a 13 percent reduction in the net of tax wage.
Alternatively, one can argue that a worker can change jobs as an additional way to
change hours.
Saez shows that the optimal program is instead a classical negative income tax pro-
gram, with a substantial income guarantee that is phased out at a high rate.
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